This paper presents a question of topological dynamics and demonstrates that its affirmation would establish the existence of approximate equilibria in all quitting games. A quitting game is an un-discounted stochastic game with finitely many players where every player has only two moves, to end the game with certainty or to allow the game to continue. If nobody ever acts to end the game, all players receive payoffs of 0.
Introduction and Background
A stochastic game is played in stages. At every stage the game is in some state of the world, known by all players. The action combination that was chosen by all the players, together with the current state, determine the stage payoff that each player receives and the probability distribution according to which the new state of the game is chosen. The past history of moves and states is known by all players.
For any ≥ 0, an -equilibrium in a game is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can gain in payoff by more than by choosing a different strategy, given that all the other players do not change their strategies. An equilibrium is an -equilibrium for = 0. We say that approximate equilibria exist if for every there exists an -equilibrium.
An outstanding open question of game theory is whether all stochastic games with finitely many players, states and moves have approximate equilibria. The interest in this question has been made acute by the proof by N. Vieille (2000 a,b,c) of the existence of approximate equilibria for all twoperson stochastic games with finitely many states and moves.
In this paper, we consider a special class of stochastic games called quitting games, and introduced in full generality by Solan and Vieille (2001) . In a quitting game each player has only two moves, c for continue and q for quit. As soon as one or more of the players at any stage chooses q, the game stops and the players receive their payoffs, which are determined by the subset of players that choose simultaneously the move q. As long as no player has stopped the game, all players receive a payoff of zero.
Examples of quitting games were studied first by Flesch, Thuijsman, and Vrieze (1997) . Interest in quitting games is due largely to their discovery of a game with cyclic symmetry with respect to the players such that for all sufficiently small > 0 and all equilibria the future expected payoffs conditioned by the event that nobody has ended the game yet change dramatically with the progression of stages, even when restricting to those stages which are reached with a probability of at least one-half.
It is not clear why quitting games should have approximate equilibria, and the existing results concerning this question are limited.
E. Solan (1999) proved that all three player quitting games have approximate equilibria (and this proof concerns a broader class of stochastic games). There is a proof of approximate equilibria by Solan and Vieille (2001) for a subclass of quitting games involving very restricted conditions on the payoffs.
There are proofs by Solan and Vieille (2002) and by Solan and Vohra (2001, 2002) of the existence of approximate correlated equilibria for quitting games. The Solan and Vieille proof is for all stochastic games with finitely many states and moves, and the Solan and Vohra proof is for an intermediate class of games, however showing a special type of approximate correlated equilibrium. Correlated equilibria are equilibria with respect to an extended game (including a correlation device) and therefore these results do not pertain directly to the existence of equilibria of the original quitting game.
There is a four player example by Solan and Vieille (2001) with approximate equilibria and with the same property mentioned above pertaining to the Flesch, Thuijsman, and Vrieze example (1997) but with the additional property that there is some triple > 0, δ > 0 and γ > 0 such that every -equilibrium has a stage reached with a probability of at least γ where some player quits the game with a probability of at least ρ.
The complexity of quitting games lies in the potentially large number of players. Even with four players, it is not clear why all quitting games should have approximate equilibria. We describe a simple four player quitting game. The players are represented modulo 4. They are paired in two teams, Player 1 with Player 3, Player 2 with Player 4. If Player i quits alone he gives himself a payoff of 1, gives his partner Player i + 2 a payoff of 100, and gives the other two players payoffs of 0. If Player i + 2 quits and his partner Player i doesn't quit then Player i receives 100, regardless of who else might quit. Whenever Players i and i + 2 do not quit but one or both of the other two players quits then Players i and i + 2 receive 0. If both Players i and i + 1 quit, then Player i receives a payoff of −1 no matter who else might quit. If Player i quits, Player i + 1 does not quit and either Player i − 1 or Player i + 2 quits, then Player i receives 99 (also if both i − 1 and i + 2 quit). This exhausts all cases. For any proposed -equilibrium one must ask why the player partnered with the one who stops with the highest probability (with respect to the start of the game) would ever wish to stop the game. If the answer is indeed that he should never choose the move q, then his partner who stops with the highest probability should either stop the game immediately or he should be the only player who stops the game. Neither behavior would describe an equilibrium for any positive between 0 and 1/2. On the other hand we think this game belongs to a class of quitting games whose existence of approximate equilibria can be proven similarly to Theorem 3 below.
Our study of quitting games brought us to what could be considered a relatively new topic of dynamic systems. For want of a better term, we call it "Discrete-Time Viability Theory". Conventional Viability Theory concerns continuous-time dynamic processes with some control mechanism and the ability of these processes to stay within given sets; see Aubin (1991) . First we give a general description of Discrete-Time Viability Theory, and then present the question that relates this topic to quitting games.
Assume that E is an Euclidean space and F is a correspondence from E to E, meaning that it can be represented as a subset of E × E (where the projection of F to the first copy of E can be perceived to be the domain and the projection of F to the second copy can be perceived to be the range). For every x ∈ E define F (x) := {y | (x, y) ∈ F }. A forward orbit of the correspondence F is a sequence (x 0 , x 1 , . . .) of points of E such that for every non-negative integer n ≥ 0 we have (x n , x n+1 ) ∈ F . An extended forward orbit is a sequence ((x j,0 , x j,1 , . . .) | 0 ≤ j < Q) of forward orbits, possibly with Q = ∞, such that for every j with j + 1 < Q we have lim k→∞ x j,k = x j+1,0 . The extended forward orbit has bounded variation if j<Q ∞ i=0 ||x j,i − x j,i−1 || < ∞, and otherwise it has unbounded variation. By the cluster points of an extended orbit we mean the cluster points of the last orbit (if it exists) or the limit of some subsequence of points where the first index goes to infinity. An extended forward orbit converges to a point if this point is the only cluster point of the orbit. Bounded variation implies convergence, but the converse doesn't hold.
If X is defined as a subset of a Euclidean space E, ∂X will stand for the boundary of X relative to E. The distance in Euclidean space will be the Euclidean distance.
We assume two types of conditions on a correspondence F .
1) There is a subset C ⊆ E with a property that from every point in ∂C the correspondence F contains a motion back into the set C (meaning that for every x ∈ ∂C there is a y ∈ C with (x, y) ∈ F ), 2) There is some kind of continuity in the definition of F (giving F closure and relating its definition on the interior of C to its definition on the boundary of C).
The topic concerns under what explicit conditions does there exist a forward orbit or an extended forward orbit (possibly with additional properties) for F . With most existing literature on discrete-time dynamic systems the iterations are well defined for trivial reasons and the main questions concern their properties or behavior. Our concerns may have a closer relation to algebraic topology and fixed point theory, though explicitly they are problems of dynamics. A good reference on iterating correspondences is McGehee (1992) .
Two examples are given in the last section that demonstrate how there can be no orbits in some contexts if one does not require that some of the motions from the boundary of the set C are small.
A homeomorphism between two topological spaces X and Y is a bijective map that demonstrates that X and Y are topologically equivalent. This means additionally that the collection of open sets of X are mapped bijectively to the collection of open sets of Y .
A homotopy is a continuous map h :
where X and Y are topological spaces. Two functions f : X → Y and g : X → Y are homotopic if f and g both can be represented as h t := h(·, t) for some t ∈ [0, 1] (and some homotopy h). If Y can be embedded in a convex space then the homotopy
A set X is contractible if there is a homotopy h : X × [0, 1] → X and a point y ∈ X such that for all x ∈ X h(x, 1) = y and h(x, 0) = x.
For any finite set A by R A we mean the real vector space of dimension |A| whose coordinates are in the set A. For any r ∈ R A and a ∈ A by r a we mean the a coordinate of r. Let 0 stand for the origin of any Euclidean space. For every non-negative integer n define S n := {r ∈ R n+1 | ||r|| = 1}. Given any subset B of S n we define the convex cone generated by B to be the set {r ∈ R
In this paper we show (Theorem 2) that all quitting games have approximate equilibria if the following question can be affirmed:
be a union of finitely many compact and convex polytopes (intersections of finitely many half-spaces)
be a homotopy such that 1) for every x ∈ ∂C and all t ∈ [0, 1] J(x, t) = (x, x) and for all x ∈ C J(x, 0) = (x, x), and 2) conversely (x, x) ∈ J(C, 1) implies that x ∈ ∂C.
Let V be a compact neighborhood of ∂C, and let G be a compact subset of V × R n . Let F be a compact subset of R n × R n and define F δ ⊆ F by (x, y) ∈ F δ if and only if (x, y) ∈ F and ||y − x|| ≤ δ. Assume that 3) F contains both J(C, 1) and G, and that there is a γ > 0 such that 4) F γ ⊆ G. Furthermore assume that 5) for every x ∈ V the set G(x) is contractible and contains x, 6) if the distance between x ∈ V and ∂C ∩ C i is no more than γ then there is a y ∈ G(x) with dist (y, C i ) ≤dist (x, C i ) such that ||y − x|| ≥ γ and the closed line segment from x to y is in G(x), 7) if lim i→∞
for some pair of sequences x i and y i both converging to a point x ∈ ∂C with (x i , y i ) ∈ J(C, 1) and y i = x i for every i then the direction s is in the convex cone generated by directions y−x ||y−x|| satisfying (x, y) ∈ G, ||y − x|| ≥ γ and that the entire closed line segment from x to y is in C, and 8) C is contractible. Does there exist an extended forward orbit of F with unbounded variation?
What is the connection between quitting games and the topological question?
There is a strong connection between quitting games and another area of game theory usually not associated with stochastic games -structure theorems used to establish stability properties of one-shot games. We remind the readers of the main theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens, (1986) . Let N be a finite player set, (A j | j ∈ N ) the finite sets of actions for the players, X the space of all |A 1 |×. . .×|A
|N |
| matrices with vector payoff entries from R N . For any x ∈ X let Γ x be the one stage game defined by the matrices determined by x. LetÃ be j∈N ∆(A j ), the strategy space, (where ∆(A j ) is the simplex of probability distributions on A j ). Let E ⊆ X ×Ã be the correspondence defined by E(x) := {y ∈Ã | y is an equilibrium of the game Γ x }. Let π : X ×Ã → X be the canonical projection. The structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens states that there is a straight line homotopy
is exactly the graph of the correspondence E, and the function H can be extended continuously to the one-point compactification of X (meaning that for every compact set C ⊆ X there is an R > 0 large enough that if the norm ||x|| exceed R then for all t ∈ [0, 1] the point H(x, t) does not lie over C). Here we have slightly modified the statement of the structure theorem, using the fact thatÃ is convex.
For a quitting game, we can consider the following matrix: in all positions where at least someone has chosen q the corresponding payoff vector is placed. Where all players choose the move c we place a variable vector payoff x ∈ R N that represents the future expected payoff on the next stage given that nobody chose to quit. We could consider what the Kohlberg-Mertens structure theorem could say about the equilibrium correspondence that lies over this subspace isomorphic to R N , in particular what happens when this correspondence is iterated indefinitely.
There are two problems with applying the Kohlberg-Mertens structure theorem as suggested above. First, we must understand how the equilibrium correspondence (described by the structure theorem) behaves on such subspaces of X. More critical is how the equilibrium correspondence behaves on subsets of vectors that are realized through long term play. Second, if some player can receive more than a payoff of zero by stopping the game alone then the part of the equilibrium correspondence where every player chooses c with certainty is useless to the construction of an approximate equilibrium. Removing these parts of the equilibrium correspondence may destroy important topological properties.
To overcome the two above mentioned problems of applying the KohlbergMertens structure theorem, we prove a new version of the structure theorem that is especially suited to quitting games. In particular, we marginalize those points of the equilibrium correspondence that involve zero probability for the move q. This marginalization is the key step in proving that an affirmation of Question 1 implies the existence of approximate equilibria.
We are agnostic concerning both Question 1 and the existence of approximate equilibria in quitting games. At the present, we tend to think that there are counter-examples to both, however that a game theoretical counter-example is very difficult to find due precisely to its connection to this question and its topological contents. We present the topological question with the hope that it will be the key to understanding approximate equilibria in quitting games -that the existence of approximate equilibria would be proven best by an affirmation of the topological question (and furthermore that a generalization of the topological question could be central to proving approximate equilibrium existence for all multi-player stochastic games) or that the topological question would be refuted best by a quitting game counter-example.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the formal model of quitting games and defines more precisely the challenge of proving the existence of approximate equilibria. The third section proves our version of the structure theorem. The fourth section establishes the connection between Question 1 and the existence of approximate equilibria. The fifth section considers questions related to Question 1.
The Model and the Challenge
In this section we formulate the problem of equilibrium existence as a problem of dynamic systems. Primarily we discuss the work of Solan and Vieille (2001) 
Players, strategies and payoffs
Let N be the set of players. Due to the above mentioned result of E. Solan, we could assume that |N | ≥ 4; however, for the sake of completeness we will assume only that |N | ≥ 2. Each player has exactly two moves, q and c, q for "quit" and c for "continue".
For every player let [0, 1] stand for her strategy space in a one stage game, with the quantity p ∈ [0, 1] representing the probability that she chooses to end the game (with the move q). N is the set of players, and [0, 1] is that it represents the ability of the players to punish Player j with pre-determined strategies (for example as part of an approximate equilibrium). Because the other players are limited in their ability to coordinate their moves, this min-max value could be strictly greater than the max-min value when there are at least two other players. 
Equilibrium correspondences
is the future expected payoff for player j before the moves are made at the stage i, conditioned on the fact that all players chose c at all stages before i. This means that r i is the expected payoff vector for the quitting game that begins at stage i.
Define a function q :
The function q is the total probability that at least one player chooses the move q.
A strategy profile p = (p i | i = 0, 1, 2, . . .) is a sequence of perfect one-shot equilibria if for every stage i and every player j the following holds:
We want to consider correspondences generated by moving backward from stage i + 1 to stage i through an approximate equilibrium of the one-shot game. For any , ρ ≥ 0 we construct correspondences
in the following way. We set
is a subset of the equilibria of the game Γ r with at least a ρ probability that somebody chooses to quit; F ,ρ (r) are their corresponding payoffs.
Basic results
Lemma A: An absorbing sequence of perfect one-shot equilibria generates a γ equilibrium for the relation = cγ 6 for some c > 0 that is determined by the number of players and a bound on the absolute value of all payoffs.
Proof: Solan and Vieille (2001) proved this result without Condition iii) but with the condition that every player quitting alone receives a positive payoff, (meaning v j > 0 for all j ∈ N ). However their additional condition is used in their proof only to demonstrate that r
The underlying justification for Lemma A (explicit in Solan and Vieille 2001) is the following: either over some long period of near certain quitting this is due almost exclusively to the actions of a single player, or over all long periods of near certain quitting this is due to the actions of at least two players. If the former is true, then there will an approximate equilibrium resulting from the quitting behavior of this one actor, and enforced by punishment in the event that this player refuses to end the game. If the latter is true, then the passivity of any player cannot prevent an end to the game and the stage for stage equilibrium property will imply a sufficient cumulative equilibrium property.
Remark 1: For the sake of proving that there is a sequence of perfect one-shot 2 equilibria we can assume that ||x − y|| > 0, (x, y) ∈ F ,0 and x in {z | ∀j z Proof: We assume the existence of an extended forward orbit ((
Let x be any cluster point of this sequence.
. Let x l,m and x l,n be any two points in this sequence with m < n such that both vectors are within /8 of x and
Observe what happens by reversing the order of the strategies between x l,m and x l,n and repeating them cyclically and infinitely, meaning
, and define (r i | i = 0, 1, . . .) to be the vectors representing the expected payoffs as generated above. For every k = 0, 1, . . .r k(n−m) will be within /8 of x l,n , since the probability of quitting from the deleted part of the sequences does not exceed 8M . But then for ever k = 0, 1, . . . and 0
After discarding the stages where 0 was the corresponding strategy we have a cyclic orbit of F ,δ for some positive δ. The rest follows by Lemma A.
Let x be any cluster point of the sequence (x 0,0 , x 0,1 , . . .). As with Case 1 let x m,0 and x n,0 be any two points in this sequence such that both are within /5 of x and m<l<n
. By Remark 1 we can assume without loss of generality that
Exactly as with Case 1, reversing the order of the corresponding strategies (
, and dropping the ones with zero probability of quitting, will generate a cyclic orbit of F ,δ for some positive δ.
2.
Proposition B: Assume that each payoff in (v(A) | ∅ = A ⊆ N ) has been changed by no more than δ > 0. For every ≥ 0 an absorbing sequence of perfect one-shot equilibria for the resulting game is also an absorbing sequence of perfect one-shot + δ equilibria for the original game.
Proof: Because each r j i determined by the strategy profile cannot change by more than δ, it follows directly from the conditions defining the perfect one-shot + δ equilibria.
2.
there is a member p of E ,1 (x) (with q(p) = 1), then there is an -equilibrium for any > 2 .
Proof: The players are requested to play p, following by the punishment of any player j with p
If there is a one stage equilibrium as described in Proposition C we say that it is an instant + -equilibrium. The
The main goal of this section is to prove the following structure theorem for quitting games.
Theorem 1: There is a straight line homotopy 
The part of the equilibrium correspondence that is useless for understanding the approximate equilibria of quitting games is that coming from the complement of W . Its topological marginalization is the third property. The fourth property is analogous to the property in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) that the homotopy can be extended continuously to the one-point compactification, and it plays a critical role in this paper.
The map φ
We fix any with 0 < ≤ 1. (Although plays no significant role in this section, its use as a variable will be important later.) We define a map φ fromẼ 0,0 to R N in the following way. Given any (
Because we consider only those equilibria with q(p) < 1, the map φ is well defined and continuous. The most dramatic aspect of the definition of φ is the reduction in the value of φ j for a player j who chooses q with significant probability. On the other hand, the dominance of M over all the payoffs from the game implies that if a player j chooses c with certainty then increasing the probabilities that the other players choose q will increase the value of φ j .
3.3
The bijectivity of φ Proof: Let (x, p) and (x,p) be two distinct equilibria inẼ 0,0 . Clearly if p =p then q(p) = 1 implies that φ(x, p) = φ(x,p) if and only if x =x. Therefore we assume that p =p, and we assume that j ∈ N is a player such that |p 
)M . The first inequality follows because with (x, p) Player j does not choose q with certainty; the second inequality follows because t is the largest difference in probability used by any player and all differences in payoffs are less than 2M/3; the equality at the end follows because with (x,p) Player j chooses q with some positive probability less than one.
Look at the consequences of φ
) from the definition of map φ and the quantity t =p
After ignoring the ≤ 1 we have from the definition of φ j and the equality φ
Together with the last paragraph we
(1−t) |N | > |N | − 1 and dropping a power of M and |N | we conclude that (1
For a contradiction we need only show that 4|N |t + (1 − t)
> 0 for all 0 < t ≤ 1. If t = 0 there is an equality. We get our claim by taking the derivative in t of this function and showing that this derivative must be positive for all the values 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. The derivative is
, which is at least 2|N | for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Injectivity is proven.
If is continuous, (meaning with the injectivity and continuity of φ that it is a homeomorphism).
Proof: Let x ∈ R N be arbitrary, and let ζ :
we have a well defined and unique x with (x, p) ∈ Y t . (For a fixed p and any player j one knows from t < 1 that there is a valuex j ∈ R high enough and a valuex j ∈ R low enough so that if the other players acted according to p in the game Γx then Player j would prefer c but Player j would prefer to choose q in the game Γxj . Betweenx
Consider what happens when φ is applied to the set Y t . We defineφ :
The definition of t assures with any p ∈ [0, t]
This follows from the definition of φ j and the fact that a
Assuming that x is not already inφ ([0, t] N ) to show that x is in the image of φ it suffices to find a y ∈φ ([0, t] Claim B: For every y ∈φ ([0, t] 
Claim C:φ is a homeomorphism from [0, t] for all j ∈ N . These bounds on the partial derivatives confirm all three claims. Claims A follows from arbitrary small decreases in the values of the coordinates in the support of p and the fact that the desired direction of the vector s lies in the interior of the convex cone generated by the directions defined by the partial derivatives. Claim B results from the same argument and small increases in all coordinates of p. Claim C follows from Lemma 1 and the fact, easy to confirm, that the Jacobian determinant is bounded uniformly far away from zero (on the negative side if |N | is odd).
We assume without loss of generality that x ∈φ ([0, t] 
, and therefore the domain of w is not empty. By Claim Cφ it is necessary for t to be at least 1 − 
But with w less than or equal to 1 20 q.e.d.
More properties of φ
The following proposition is helpful to understanding the correspondence φ. to (β, p) ∈Ẽ 0,0 and p is very close to but not equal to 0 then we know that α is close to but not in ∂W , and vice versa. Now we quantify these relations, (which we will need later).
For any p ∈ [0, 1]
Proposition 1: Let φ be defined by 0 < ≤ 1. Assume that there is no instant δ + equilibrium and let R be large enough to satisfy Theorem 1. Let w > 0 be small enough so that φ
implies that Player j chooses q with positive probability and p
Proof: 1) Because the difference between any two payoffs is less than 2M/3, the payoff for Player j if she chooses q is at least v
Since c j cannot be less than this quantity we have c
Since 1 − w is an upper bound for the probability that any player quits, the definition of φ(β, p) = α implies that α 
The rest of the argument follows identically to that of 1), but with β replacing v.
3) Because the difference between any two payoffs is less than 2M/3, the payoff for Player j if she chooses q is no more than v There are two main problems with the correspondence F 0,0 . First, in most interesting cases of quitting games (where there are no 0 equilibria) all extended forward orbits of F 0,0 will have bounded variation and converge to points in ∂W . To get around this problem we glue to F 0,0 a correspondence contained within F δ,0 for some small δ > 0 and defined on points near to ∂W . This new correspondence will involve only very small motions but enough to allow, either sometimes or always, for the existence of unbounded variation extended forward orbits. The same idea was contained in Solan and Vieille (2001) , but without the application of a structure theorem.
Second, we need a theoretical context, that of correspondences defined on compact sets, and the relevant set W is unbounded. We intersect W with a set whose boundary is far enough away from the origin that the vectors of this boundary cannot have anything to do with payoffs associated with the quitting game, (here the quantity R from Lemma 3 is used). We extend our sub-correspondence of F δ,0 to these distant points in a way so that all extended forward orbits of unbounded variation must move toward and stay with vectors that are relevant to the quitting game. Also we want all relevant properties of the correspondence found on ∂W to hold on the new boundary that includes points far away from ∂W .
The only serious problem with this approach concerns a player who would never choose to quit alone in the quitting game. for all players k = j. There will be a small positive δ > 0 such that Player j quitting alone with probability δ would represent an equilibrium in E 0,δ . However, in a quitting game Player j would never be motivated to act in this way, since this player would be opting for a payoff below what she could guarantee herself! Therefore we must avoid applying F 0,δ to such vectors x, and this is our main complication. Even worse, let v({j})
Then Player j quitting alone on each stage with some small δ > 0 would satisfy all Properties but iii of a sequence of perfect one-shot δM equilibria.
For any positive δ > 0 define a player j ∈ N to be a δ-normal player when χ j < v j + δ. A δ-normal player j can be punished effectively (relative to the quantity δ) for not ending the game alone. A normal player is a δ-normal player for all positive δ > 0, and defineN to be the set of normal players. A player is normal if and only if by quitting alone he receives at least his min-max payoff. A player that is not normal will be called an abnormal player. Keep in mind that almost everything that follows would be significantly simpler if there were only normal players. 
The Assumptions:
From now on we assume that > 0 is fixed. Until we reach the conclusion of this section, we proceed with the following Assumptions 1 through 5. These assumptions will be justified by the conclusion where we will prove (Theorem 2) that an affirmation of Question 1 implies that all quitting games have approximate equilibria. Assumption 1: there is at least one normal player. Assumption 2: the determinants of all the matrices A Q (with |Q| ≥ 2) are not zero. 
Two lemmatta concerning χ Lemma 4:
1) For any abnormal player j v({k})
N then the probability that at least two players choose q simultaneously is no more than ρ(|N | − 1) times the probability that at least some player chooses q.
3) For any abnormal player j the payoff to Player j conditioned on quitting from any p ∈ [0, ρ] 
3) It follows directly from Parts 1) and 2).
2.
Recall the definition of p −j from the third section.
Proof: The first part follows directly from the definition of χ. If the second part were not true, then the payoff to Player j conditioned by the other players quitting (according to p −j ) would be strictly less than χ 
The set C
For any player j define C j to be the set
We cannot exclude quitting behavior involving only abnormal players, since all equilibrium behavior could involve some stages where two or more abnormal players choose q with positive probability and all normal players choose c with certainty. On the other hand, we must exclude quitting behavior involving only one abnormal player. This is behind the special construction C j,k for pairs of abnormal players. The following three lemmatta are useful for understanding the geometry of the set C.
Lemma 6: The set C is equal toĈ\D. The set ∂D is the union of the two sets 2
for all l ∈ {j, k}}, and any point in ∂D must be in ∂D j for some abnormal j. By increasing all coordinates we enter the interior of D j . The only question is whether there is a sufficiently small δ so that by changing all coordinates by no more than δ we must stay inside ofD. Consider five cases for a point in Lemma 7: ∂C is the union of the following sets:
Furthermore every point of ∂C is in the closure of the interior of C.
Proof: First we show that all the listed sets are in ∂C and that any point of any of these sets is arbitrarily close to a point in the interior of C.
Let x be any point in B 1 j for a normal j. By increasing all coordinates of x one leaves C and by decreasing slightly all the coordinates one enters the interior of C j .
Let x be any point in B Next we show that the boundary of C is contained in the union of these sets.
Recognize ∂Ĉ as the union of
and ∂Ĉ
With C =Ĉ\D from Lemma 6 andD an open set we have ∂C = (∂Ĉ\D) ∪ (∂D ∩Ĉ). First we look at ∂Ĉ\D. 
, has no intersection withD, and is equal to the set B 
has no intersection withD and it defines the set B 5 j,k . Next we look at ∂D ∩Ĉ and use Lemma 6. For every abnormal j and normal k look at {x | x For any pair j, k of abnormal players we have ∂C j,k equal to the union of the three sets ∂C
We confirm that the intersection of these sets with U is always in the set D. By the above, we need only check the intersection with the sets B 
to be the canonical projections. Define the functions ψ 1 :
Next we must define the correspondence G. For every normal j ∈N define V j to be the set {x ∈ [−M,
More complicated is to define G on V D . For every normal player j define the vector
We need to show that G is compact. It suffices to show that if
. This follows directly from Lemma 4.
With Assumption 5 and the small positive quantity w defined from Proposition 1 (with δ = ), we defineŵ to be will not be relevant to defining the correspondence F near to cluster points of any unbounded variation extended forward orbit is easy to believe. Harder to believe is that the same will be true for points near to the set D (either from J(C, 1) or from G). Indeed that is what we will show. By truncating the orbit so that it starts at a point near to a cluster point we will get an extended forward orbit of unbounded variation defined entirely by F 0,0 and G O . The connection to Proposition A will be established by the following lemma. Next consider the possibility that α k < −R for some player k. Let t equal max j∈N p j , and let l be such a player obtaining this maximum. We defined R so large that t must be at least 9/10. We have that α Proof: J is continuous because all functions defining it are continuous. 
, the image of φ x , is contractible to x with the homotopy h(y, t) := φ x ((1 − t)φ −1 x (y)) (as then this function is well defined and continuous). The above inequality works with ξ = ρ, and follows by elementary calculus, as we demonstrate now. Assume that r ∈ S Q−1 is defined by r :=
(p) for some p on the straight path between p 1 and p 2 . Because the probability of any player other than i ∈ A quitting is never more than (|N | − 1)ρ, the partial derivative
(an additional quantity ρ comes from the fact that |x Proof: By observing the second (image) part of F we know that for every abnormal player the coordinates of the cluster points of any orbit of unbounded variation are between 1−M/3 and M |N |, while for normal players they are between 1 − M/3 and −1 + M/3. Let (x l,i | l < Q, i = 0, 1, . . .) be the extended forward orbit. Define the set T to be the cluster points of the orbit, and define T to be the subset of points in the orbit that are within a distance of γ from T .
Step i; Show that if j is an abnormal player and x ∈ T then 
Putting everything together we get y Step iii is proven.
N is empty, we conclude that x ∈ T and (x, y) ∈ G imply that dist (x, D) > 5ρ and (x, y) ∈ G O .
Step iv; Show that if (x, y) = J(α, 1) with x ∈ T and ρ < dist (α, D) < 2ρ then that there is some j ∈ N with α 
for some normal player k or the same for at least two abnormal players we must assume that some abnormal player k other than j chooses q with probability at least 20M . But then we can switch roles: whether β
there is a player other than k choosing q with probability at least 20M , meaning that indeed α
Conclusion
Theorem 2: An affirmation of Question 1 also affirms the existence of approximate equilibria in quitting games.
Proof: We start with any quitting game with at least two players. First, is there at least one normal player? If there are no normal players, by Remark 2 there is an equilibrium of the game for every positive . Otherwise, we can make Assumption 1, that there is at least one normal player.
Second, we choose any δ > 0 and change no payoff by more than δ to satisfy Assumption 2.
Third, we choose an > 0 smaller than δ and also small enough so that all -normal players are normal players, namely Assumption 3. By Proposition B and either Proposition A and Lemma A it suffices to show with the altered game either that there exists an extended forward orbit of F ,0 with unbounded variation in {x | x j ≥ χ j − for all players j} or that there is an absorbing sequence of perfect one-shot 2 equilibria.
Fourth, is there an absorbing sequence of perfect one-shot 2 equilibria generated by a stationary strategy profile? If so then we are done. Otherwise by Remark 1 we can proceed with Assumption 4.
Fourth, is there an instant + equilibrium? If so, by Proposition C the game has a 3 equilibrium (and also an absorbing sequence of 2 perfect equilibria generated by stationary strategies). Otherwise, we proceed with Assumption 5.
With all five assumptions, the map φ, the set C (with its composing sets C j and C j,k ), the homotopy J, the closed neighborhood V , and the quantity γ are defined as above. By Proposition 2 (and the affirmation of Question 1) there is an extended forward orbit of F with unbounded variation.
We can restrict ourselves to that part of the orbit that starts within a distance of γ from a cluster point of the orbit, and the remaining part will still be of unbounded variation. By Proposition 3 and Lemma 9 this orbit is also an orbit of F ,0 (x) with the desired property with regard to the values χ j for all players j ∈ N .
q.e.d.
Related Questions
The following theorem demonstrates the intuitive basis for believing in an affirmation of Question 1.
Theorem 3: Assume Properties 1, 2,3, and 6 of Question 1 (not necessarily assuming Properties 4,5,7 and 8) and assume additionally that J(C, 1) is the graph of a continuous function from C to R n . The conclusion of Question 1 is affirmed.
are problematic. It suggests that a set larger than the original contractible C should be used to formulate an appropriate question of Discrete-Time Viability Theory.
Question 2: Let C be any connected and compact subset of an Euclidean space E. Let f : C → E be a continuous function such that f and the identity map on C are homotopic and such that all the functions f t in the homotopy (with f 0 the identity, f 1 = f ) have the property that f t (∂C) ⊆ C. Does there exist a forward orbit for the function f ?
First consider the following example, which is not a counter-example to Question 2. This example was shown to me by Tamas Wiandt.
Example 1: Let E be the circle and let C be the compact set of angles between 0 and , (namely 2/5 of the way around the circle). The function f takes both end points of C back into C, and yet from any start in C four or less iterations of the function f result in entering the compliment of C. Of course E is not a Euclidean space, and the problem with translating this example to one dimensional space is that a "point at infinity" is not allowed in an Euclidean space.
The following counter-example to Question 1 was shown to me by Massimo Gobbino. ). After a few iterations all points of an orbit of f will have a radius strictly between 2 and 3. With regard to the angle we have the identical situation of Example 1, implying that there can be no forward orbit. Lastly it is easy to confirm the desired homotopy property through the level of radius 2. we have x = f • r(x) = f (x). It would be tempting to define a correspondence F based on a quitting game and a choice of > 0 so that all forward orbits must have unbounded variation and the existence of a forward orbit implies that there is a sequence of perfect one-shot equilibrium. Perhaps there is a way to do this, but the following question and counter-example generate some doubt concerning this approach.
Question 3: Let E be a Euclidean space and C a contractible subset of E of the same dimension. Let G ⊆ C × E be a compact set such that 1) for every c ∈ C {y ∈ E | (c, y) ∈ G} is a non-empty convex set, and 2) for every c ∈ C all of the extremal points of G(c) := {y | (c, y) ∈ G} are in C. The following example was constructed by Massimo Gobbino and myself. Starting at (−2, 8), we move outside of C to (8, 8) in one step. Starting in W 2 \W 1 , we move to (−2, 8) . Starting at W 1 \W 2 , we move to W 2 or outside of C in one step. Finally, from any point of C in one step we move to either W 1 \W 2 , W 2 \W 1 , or to the compliment of C. The homotopy property can be satisfied by a translation of the point (0, 0) to the point (8, 8) .
